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Until the mid-90s, the more active among the Brussels-listed stocks were traded in parallel
segments: \spot" (that is, with t + 3 settlement) and \forward" (periodic settlement at the
end of a two- or three-week period). The forward market was cheaper, deeper, unhampered by
price limits, convenient also for shortsales, and played by the pros; so it looks likely to be the
more ecient tier. In the forward markets, where the signal is stronger, we do nd that time
value aects prices. In spot markets there is very little evidence in favor or against a settlement
eect, perhaps because the time value item has a very small variability. As expected, the time
value signals are somewhat stronger in forward prices and noticeably so in forward premiums,
but the estimates remain below our theoretical priors. We also nd that price discrepancies
are autocorrelated, probably indicating market ineciency. A closer look reveals that positive
forward premiums are persistent whereas negative ones vanish overnight. This is consistent
with a market-imperfection explanation, where problems with raising cash (shorting money)
are more important than problems with shorting stocks, thus creating preferred habitats for
purchases (forward) and for sales (spot).
JEL G14, G15
Key words: dual markets, price discovery, settlement eect, microstructureTime Value in Spot and Forward Prices
on the Brussels Stock Exchange
Introduction
Until 1996, the Brussels Stock Exchange had two parallel trading tiers: a \spot" market tier
with third-day delivery where all stocks were traded and, for the most active stocks, also a
parallel \forward" tier with xed-date delivery. The forward market was cheaper, deeper,
unhampered by price limits, convenient also for shortsales, fully computerized, and played by
the pros. Both segments were order-driven, and their opening prices were set via a call. So
there were no rm bids and asks, implying that the usual no-arbitrage predictions about price
dierences should be weakened into statements about expectations.
A companion paper addresses the issue as to which market was noisier, that is, which acted
as the price discoverer, during the period 1989-1996. In this paper we study the behavior of
the spot-forward price dierences or the forward premiums as they emerged, ex post, from the
opening call. There are two issues of interest. First, we would expect a statistically clear time-
value or settlement eect in the forward premiums, stronger and statistically more detectable
than the settlement eects one expects in either spot or forward returns. The second issue is
whether the forward premiums are consistent with the notion of market eciency, where prices
are unpredictable, or at least, price discrepancies across markets are.
Our results on settlement eects are mixed, at best. In the spot market we actually see very
little evidence in favor or against a time-value eect, consistent with our priors on the power of
the tests. In the forward markets, where the time value signals should be stronger, we do nd
that time value aects prices, but the eect is substantially smaller than what theory predicts.
As expected, time value is noticeable in forward premiums, but even there the estimates remain
below our theoretical priors|and, indeed, below the results for forward returns. Next, we move
to the autocorrelation issue. We nd that forward premiums are anomalously autocorrelated,
arguably a sign of market ineciency. This then raises the question why traders do not
react to these predictable price anomalies. A closer look at the price discrepancies reveals an
asymmetry: unusually positive forward premiums are the ones that tend to persist for a long
time, while abnormally negative ones vanish overnight. In addition, large positive forward
premiums are about four times as frequent as large negative discrepancies. This pattern isA Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 2
the opposite of what one would expect if the problem had been a lack of shortselling in the
spot market. Instead, the anomaly suggests a cash-is-king eect, that is, problems with raising
liquidities, steering buyers towards the forward market and sellers to the cash market, thus
creating episodes of persistently high forward premiums.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the markets and the data.
In Section 2 we start from a standard noisy-price model and derive, discuss, and test alter-
native tests for settlement eects in, respectively, spot returns, forward returns, and forward
premiums. Section 3 provides the tests for autocorrelation; we also show that the lack of e-
ciency is not related to diculties in going short but rather to simple nancing considerations.
Section 4 concludes.
1 The Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange: Institutional Back-
ground
Brussels used to have not only its own stock market (the Brussel Stock Exchange (BSE), since
2001 integrated into Euronext), but even a two-tiered one: a \spot" market tier with third-day
delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel \forward" tier with xed-date delivery. There
used to be twenty-four xed such settlement dates per year, implying that the trading periods
typically lasted about two weeks|hence their name quinzaine, two-week period.1 Details
about the market organization are crucial for our analysis. In this section, we describe the
price mechanisms in the forward and spot market and the delivery rules as they applied during
the sample period.
1.1 The price mechanism in the forward tier
The forward market used to work via a pure public limit order book (which, during the sample
period, was kept by a version of Toronto's Computer-Aided Trading System, CATS). Thus,
although brokers were allowed to trade on their own account, they did not act as market
makers, and their main role on the oor was to pass on the orders from the public to the
exchange. At 9 p.m. the one-hour pre-market started, during which orders could be added
1The forward market has now disappeared, following an EU-directed \T  t + 7 days" rule implemented in
the 1990s. London used to have a two-weekly xed-delivery system too, Paris had delivery at the end of the
month in its \forward" section for big stocks. (There also was a spot section for small stocks). Basel oered the
choice between several delivery dates.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 3
Table 1: Tick Size in the Spot and Forward Market
price must be minimal percentage price change
a multiple of at lower end at top end
price range of scale of scale
BEF 1-500 1 100% 0.20%
BEF 502-1,500 2 0.40% 0.13%
BEF 1,505-5,000 5 0.33% 0.10%
BEF 5,010-10,000 10 0.20% 0.10%
BEF 10,025-50,000 25 0.25% 0.05%
BEF 50,050 50 0.10% |
Key One BEF is approximately EUR 0.025.
or withdrawn and CATS displayed a continuously updated preliminary market-clearing price.
Actual trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m., with a simultaneous call market for
all stocks. That is, at 10 a.m. limit orders were matched as far as possible, and executed.
For most stocks the opening represented a substantial part of the day's turnover. After the
opening round, the interactive trading session or \continuous market" started (10:00-16:30).
Throughout the continuous-market session, the four best unlled limit orders on the buying
and selling side were displayed on computer screens and could be taken up by any incoming new
order. Only brokers saw the screens: at the time of the sample, individual investors just heard
(or saw) the opening and close prices over the radio or on Teletext, at noon or in the afternoon.
Orders could also be matched directly, between brokers or in-house, provided that the price
was within the book's bid-ask spread and the trade was reported immediately to the exchange.
Large trades, i.e. blocks of at least BEF 50m (EUR 1,250,000) could be crossed or traded
outside the BSE (often in London or Paris), but had also to be reported immediately. There
were no limits on consecutive forward price changes. Limit order and trade prices were rounded
according to a schedule shown in Table 1. Until the 1996 reform, the exchange's minimum
margin requirement for a forward trade was 25 percent, but the BSE left the enforcement of
this rule to the individual brokers (who bore the default risk). Securities could be posted as
margin; in fact, many investors left most or all of their stocks with a their broker|most shares
are bearer securities|and used this portfolio as margin for forward positions. Thus, there was
no opportunity cost associated with the margin.
Prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the of-
cial price list, later De Tijd and L'Echo de la Bourse. In the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 4
1.2 The Spot Price Mechanism
Due to its lower volume, the spot market was fully computerized much later (in 1996). Like
the forward tier, it was order-driven, but the implementation was fairly dierent. First, there
was no pre-market, so that the opening price was potentially much more subject to noise than
the forward opening price even apart from volume eects. Second, because of the thinness of
the market, for most stocks there was just one trading round per day. A continuous market
existed only for the more active stocks (quoted on the \corbeille" segment), and even this
continuous market was not very active.2 Third, there was no centralized public order book
kept by the exchange. Rather, a few specialist brokers each kept their own books, and met
sometime between 1 and 1.30 p.m. on the Exchange's oor to aggregate their information
and identify the price that maximizes trade from the combined order book. Fourth, for stocks
that were not traded on the parallel forward market there were overnight price limits of 5
percent (for very thinly traded stocks, traded on the parket segment) or 10 percent (for other
stocks, traded on the \corbeille" market); and, in the corbeille market, subsequent intraday
price changes could not exceed 5 percent.
The actual pricing and trading was organized by a BSE ocial, who started by crying
out a price proposal. This price proposal equaled the price that maximized trade from the
order book if that price was within the price change limits; if not, the ocial announced the
price limit itself. In addition to the price proposal, the ocial also announced the direction
of the imbalance. If there was an excess supply (demand) at the proposed price, additional
purchase (sale) orders from the oor were solicited to reduce the imbalance in the book. If the
remaining imbalance between supply and demand at the price limit was less than 50 percent,
the specialist would decide to `reduce' most or all orders on the excess side, i.e. execute only
part of each order; the transaction price was then published in the nancial press with the
qualication \sellers reduced" or \buyers reduced". If at the price limit the imbalance between
supply and demand remained huge even after soliciting orders from the oor, there was no
trade at all, and the price limit was published as an indicative price. In practice, however,
when the imbalance was only slightly larger than 50 percent the stock's specialist brokers often
added buy or sell orders for their own account to prevent no-trade (and no-income) days.
2For stocks quoted on the corbeille, the xing was followed by the traditional (blackboard-and-chalk) version
of the continuous market: unlled orders were chalked onto the blackboard and could be picked up from the
oor, and orders could also be matched directly on the oor at a price within the book's spread.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 5
As, around 1990, the spot market list contained about 300 stocks, the stock-by-stock
opening-call prices were set more or less sequentially; the exact timing of each stock's spot
xing was not registered. For the corbeille market, prices for all traded lots were shown, in
sequence (but not time-stamped), in the ocial price list but in the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available. For the parket stocks there is just the single price.
1.3 Settlement Rules
For the BSE, the other details of the actual settlement were similar for both market tiers. The
buyer payed via a bank transfer rather than by check. This means that there was no \mail
oat" on the payment side. Still, the value dates for buyer and seller did not match perfectly:
the buyer's value date is one day before the actual settlement day, and the seller obtains value
one day after settlement.
Delivery of the stock could mean actual physical delivery of the piece of paper that rep-
resents the bearer share, if the buyer desired so. Alternatively, the buyer could ask that his
or her purchase be recorded with a netting and depository institution, the Caisse Interpro-
fessionelle/Interprofessionale Kas (CIK). The CIK merely netted the physical deliveries across
brokers if actual delivery was asked, and held the paper on behalf of investors that did not
demand physical delivery. Thus, the CIK was not a clearing house in the usual sense: it did not
act as a central counterpart, nor did it cancel an individual investor's earlier purchases against
subsequent sales (or vice versa) within one settlement period. There was some informal clear-
ing by brokers, though: brokers did not exact delivery and payment for a forward transaction
that was reversed later on via the same brokerage house and within the same quinzaine.
One function of the forward market, therefore, was to reduce the cost and hassle of mutually
osetting stock deliveries and payments for trades that had been closed out within the same
quinzaine. This partly explains why, unlike in currency markets, in the forward tier the
transaction costs for small trades were somewhat lower than in the spot tier (as illustrated
in Table 2).3 A second useful feature of the forward tier is that it allows one to take short
positions until the end of the quinzaine, positions that could then be rolled over fairly easily.
In Belgium, there was no formal legal framework for asset borrowing and spot short-selling
3Another reason for the lower transaction costs might have been the fact that the forward market tended to
have larger volumes than the spot market for the same stock.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 6
Table 2: Transaction costs, spot and forward, 1990
cost of cost of
item spot trades forward trades
BSE Commission 0.03%, max BEF 6 000y
Transaction Tax 0.17%, max BEF 10 000
Brokerage fees
- xed part BEF 200
- variable part:
order BEF 1-5m 1% .8%
order BEF 5-10m .8% .6%
order BEF 10-20m .4% .3%
order BEF 20-30m  BEF 130 000z .2%
order  BEF 30m  BEF 130 000z  BEF 120 000z
y : 40 BEF is worth approx. 1 EUR; * : plus BEF 100 for the buyer if physical delivery is asked; z : negotiable,
with the stated amounts as minima. Thus, a smallish trade of BEF 250,000 (approx. EUR 6.250) would cost
1.29 percent spot, and 1.09 percent forward. For an order of BEF 30m, the cost dierence may be as small as
10,000/30,000,000 = .033 percent.
until the 1991 Stock Market Reform Act, so until then the forward market provided the sole
organized opportunity for short positions. A third function of the forward market was to
provide the equivalent of buying on margin: the actual payment was deferred until the end of
the quinzaine (at which moment the forward contract could be rolled over), and the buyer just
posted the 25 percent security. Since leveraged buying was possible in the forward market, no
organized system of buying on margin was set up in the spot market.
1.4 Taxes
A last relevant detail is income tax. For brokers or corporations, all interest received or
paid and all short-term capital gains or losses are fully taxable or deductible. So if brokers
or corporations dominate the market in the sense that they are systematically the marginal
traders, taxes are neutral. Under personal taxation rules, capital gains or losses are neither
taxable nor deductible; nor can one deduct interest costs incurred to nance short-term trades;
and interest income is de facto taxed at the withholding tax (10 percent at the time). In short,
also for private persons the gross rate is the relevant interest rate, unless the marginal traders
are buyers of stock for whom the opportunity cost is the interest foregone on a deposit.
Dividends are largely tax-exempt for corporations; for individuals, a 25-percent withholding
tax applies. Unpublished tests show that the average price drop on ex-dividend day was equal
to the dividend net of the withholding tax|20 percent before 1984, and 25 percent thereafter.
All returns are accordingly computed from dividends net of withholding taxes.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 7
We conclude the descriptive section with some information on the data.
1.5 Data
The sample period starts early 1989, at which time the forward markets was fully computerized,
and ends in 1996; in 1997 the forward market disappeared. Euronext's historic-data CDs for
that period include the opening spot price per day, and, for the forward market, the daily
opening, high and low, and close price. Data on dividends, bonus dividends, splits, and rights
issues4 were missing, and were hand-collected from Memento der Eecten, a trade publication,
and from De Tijd, which published the Dutch-language version of the Ocial Price List. For
the risk-free rate we used the Euro-BEF 1 week middle rate from Datastream.
We discarded foreign stocks, about half of the list, since price discovery for these shares
probably happens abroad anyway. So we started from data on 119 Belgian stocks traded on
both the spot and forward tiers of the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996.
Some data cleaning was required: 16 stocks are excluded due to an insucient number of
observations (too many missing data points), 31 stocks are connected to other shares due to
a change in the name or code after a stock split or merger. Thus, 72 stocks remained. All
unusually large forward premiums or large change in the prices were double-checked with the
prices posted on the hard copies of De Tijd, including the next-day rectications for typos. All
prices that are indicated `sellers reduced', `buyers reduced', or `indicative', were considered to
be missing observations. Whenever there is a missing price, the two returns that are associated
with that price are missing too. That is, we never use cumulated returns straddling some
missing price.
Eight years of data means over 2000 trading days. The number of eectively available
observations is very variable, ranging from below 50% to 100%. There is a clear relation with
market activity. As can be seen in Table 3, the rms in the bottom third, by turnover, on
average trade only 75 (spot) or 60 (forward) percent of the time. Forward markets more often
have missing prices than spot markets, despite their higher turnovers and the absence of price
limits; this probably reects the interventions by the spot market's specialists mentioned in
Section 1.2. There also is a strong negative relation between turnover and return variance,
4A subscription right is represented by a coupon designated for the purpose, and is traded separately the
moment the stock goes ex this coupon. The market values of these \scripts" are very noisy so we worked with
the standard instrinsic value of a subscription right.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 8
Table 3: Trading Frequency and One-day Return Variance across Turnover Classes
sample number of returns Average Variance Median Variance
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward Spot Forward
All 95,591 87,549 3.26 3.43 2.23 1.91
low turnover 27,576 21,686 4.55 5.17 2.77 2.11
medium turnover 31,169 29,197 3.23 3.12 1.92 1.66
high turnover 36,848 36,670 1.99 2.00 1.61 1.88
Key Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover.
prima facie, as also illustrated via Figure 1. Much of that, however, seems to be due to the
outliers: when we consider medians the schedule is much atter.
2 Verifying the Settlement Eect in Prices In Well Integrated
Markets
The xed-lag and periodic settlement systems, as adopted by the spot and forward markets,
respectively, should each generate a specic type of seasonal in the observed stock returns.
In the xed-date (`forward') markets, consecutive prices within one settlement period are
essentially forward quotes with decreasing times to maturity, as shown in Table 4 below. It
follows that, within a given settlement period, the percentage price change corresponds to an
(unobservable) spot return minus approximately the daily risk-free rate;5 that is, percentage
price changes within a given settlement period should tend to be below the general average
return. On the other hand, there is a substantial change in time to maturity between the
last price of a settlement period and the next day's price. Thus, the percentage change that
straddles two adjacent settlement periods should consist of a true spot return plus two weeks'
(London) or one month's (Paris) worth of time value, and tend to be above the general average
return. Solnik (1990), and Crouhy, Galai and Keita (1991) document such an eect for the
French market. Solnik nds that the stock market index behaves as predicted, but on the
individual-stock level Crouhy, Galai and Keita nd evidence of overreaction, especially for
thinly traded securities. Jae and Westereld (1985) and Condoyanni, O'Hanlon and Ward
(1987) report anomalous results for the London market.
Spurious seasonals caused by time-value eects should also be observed in markets with
5This claim is exact only if riskfree rates are constant across maturities and over time.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 9
Figure 1: Asynchronism of Spot vs Forward Prices
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Key t is at 10:00 am and t +  is at 13:30 p.m.
a xed-lag delivery system. As `days' refer to working days rather than calendar days, any
intervening weekend or holiday should lead to time-value eects in prices. As Solnik (1990)
notes, there is often a day-of-the-week eect; but its size is
"... usually much larger than the expected eect of the settlement procedure, and often does
not take place on the expected day.6 This implies that the observed day-of-the-week eect
is explained by other phenomena and that the inuence of the settlement procedure is too
small to be detectable without a precise model of these other phenomena."
McFarland, Pettit, and Sung (1982) study foreign exchange markets (where, with a few
exceptions, a second-working-day rule applies). For the Vienna stock market, Gruenbichler
(1991) reports anomalous seasonals that substantially exceed the eects of time value.
We rst turn to the tests of settlement eects. In Section 2.2 we discuss the pros and
cons of tests that rely on time series of either spot returns or forward returns, relative to tests
on forward premiums. Section 2.3 introduces the way we obtain average coecients. Results
follow in Section 2.4.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 10
2.1 The Model
Let vt denote an unobservable true value based on full and correct use of all relevant available
information, expressed as a price for immediate payment and delivery. Since neither the actual
spot nor forward prices imply immediate settlement, the corresponding true \spot" and forward
values, denoted as s and f, should contain a settlement eect shown below, with n s and n f
denoting the number of calendar days to settlement and R the simple per diem interest rate. In
addition, actually observed prices are assumed to deviate from true values by a zero-mean, i.i.d.
noise term, denoted by  s or  f, respectively, which reects unanticipated orders by liquidity
traders and noise traders, as standard in microstructure models7:
noise-free prices: st+ = (1 + n s;tRt)vt+; (1)
ft = (1 + n f;tRt)vt; (2)
observed prices: St+ = st+(1 +  s;t+) = vt+(1 + n s;tRt)(1 +  s;t+); (3)
Ft = ft(1 +  f;t) = vt(1 + n f;tRt)(1 +  f;t): (4)
with Et ( s;t+) = 0 = Et ( f;t); and time t is 10:00 a.m., the opening of the forward market;
time t +  is 13:00 p.m, the opening time of the spot market.
These models are not ready for use in itself as they contain unobservable prices. The
standard way to make such models tractable, in the sense of being able to identify some key
parameters, is to consider returns|percentage changes in S or F, as is done below. In (5)
and (7), the true values have been combined into a true return, denoted as t, which is then
assumed to be unpredictable white noise; we also introduce the shorthand notation n sR and
n fR to indicate the settlement eect in a spot or forward returns, and e to indicated ln(1+).
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+ ln(1 +  s;t+)   ln(1 +  s;t+ 1); (5)
=: (n sR)t + t+ + es;t+   es;t+ 1; (6)
6See e.g. Lakonishok and Levi (1982), Jae and Westereld (1985).
7We ignore the time value of half a day as interest is calculated per entire day only.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 11
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+ ln(1 +  f;t)   ln(1 +  f;t 1); (7)
=: (n fR)t + t + ef;t   ef;t 1: (8)
2.2 Competing Test Equations for Settlement Eects: pros & cons
We consider four test equations, each with its pros and cons. The rst two are our earlier
expressions for the spot and forward returns, Equations (6) and (8). The third test equation is
the dierence of the returns which, because of the overlap in the afternoon, boils down to the
dierence between the two morning returns (10:00-13:30). The fourth focuses on the forward
premium, ln(F=S), and is obtained by subtracting the two log-price equations, the logs of (3)
and (4):
rs;t+ = (n sR)t + t+ + es;t+   es;t+ 1; (9)
rf;t = (n fR)t + t + ef;t   ef;t 1; (10)
rf;t   rs;t+ = [(n fR)t   (n fR)t] + [t   t+] + [ef;t   ef;t 1]   [es;t+   es;t+ 1];
= [(n fR)t   (n fR)t] + [m
t   m
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+ ef;t   es;t+;
= t(nf
sR)   m
t+1 + ef;t   es;t (12)
where r is the observed return (or percentage price change, including any coupon detached
between t 1 and t); (nRt) is the theoretical settlement eect in the left-hand-side variable;8
t and t+ are the one-day true returns and m
t is the true return in the morning (10:00
a.m|13:30 p.m); and et the percentage noise added in the time-t price. One can, therefore,
regress each of the left-hand-side variables on its associated theoretical time values and test
for a unit regression coecient, treating both the true return and the micro-structural noise
8Specically, for the spot returns n sRt equals ln[(1 + n s;t 1Rt 1)=(1 + n s;tRt)] where n s;t is the number of
calendar days between dat t and the settlement date, and Rt the per diem interest rate. For forward rates the
denition is analogous. For forward premiums, it equals ln[(1 + n f;tRt)=(1 + n s;tRt).A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 12
Table 4: Variability of the Time to Settlement over a Representative Two-week
Trading Period
mon tue wed thu fri mon tue wed thu fri stdev
n s 3 3 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5
n f 16 15 14 13 12 9 8 7 6 5
n for regressee rs  2 0 2 0 0  2 0 2 0 0 1.33
n for regressee rf 11  1  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  1 3.92
n for regressee rf-rs 13  1  3  1  1  1  1  3  1  1 4.64
n for regressee p 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 2 1 0 4.42
Key The table refers to two normal trading weeks. Line one shows the number of calendar days to settlement
in the spot market: three in the beginning of the week, jumping to ve as of Wednesday because a weekend
intervenes. Line 2 shows time-value days forward, relative to the settlement date which is on Wednesday in
week 3. Lines 3 and 4 show nt   nt 1, which is the sequence of time-value days in a series of spot and forward
returns, r s or r f. Lines 5 and 6 show the time value days in a series of return dierences and in a series of
forward premiums p.
terms as regression error.9
One possible objection against the rst and second test equation is that expected true
returns should be higher, on average, in periods with high risk-free rates, which would introduce
some correlation between noise and the regressor and, therefore, bias the slope coecient
upward if 4nf > 0 and downward if 4nf < 0. We provide an upper bound on this eect in
the Appendix I, where we conclude the bias must be trivial.
A second issue is statistical power, with as its two prime determinants the variances of the
regressor and of the regression error term. Most of the variability in the regressor, a time-
value eect, stems from the ever-changing number of days to settlement. Table 4 shows how,
over one two-week period, the days to delivery evolve in each market (lines 1-2) and what the
resulting time-to-settlement pattern is in spot and forward returns. Obviously, working with
spot returns provides far less power than with forward returns where, for about the same error
variance,10 the regressor has a standard deviation that is about three times higher. But either
method suers from an extra source noise, as the regression error comprises not only the two
pricing errors but also the one-day true return.
9Note, in passing, that because of the absence of market makers, every price is not a rm quote but a number
that is the stochastic outcome of an auction or call. The usual arbitrage one sees in currency markets are not
possible here because there are no rm quotes. The only type of arbitrage that can (and should) occur is when
market orders are placed; then the choice of the market should be based on the expected prices to be produced
by the opening call.
10as far as we can judge from the preliminary tests.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 13
In the next test equation, the dierence-of-return equation (11), the regressor has an even
better variability than the forward-return regression, as one can see in Table 4. If prices had
ben synchronous, there would have been no true return in the regression either. In reality,
the timing dierence means that there are two true morning return items in the residual, and
whether this is better than one full-day return is far from obvious. Moreover, this dierence-
of-returns test involves four pricing errors instead of two besides the two true return terms,
and has more missing observations: we lose any day where either a spot or a forward price is
missing, contemporaneous or lagged once. The last test equation (12) seem to have it both
ways: only a half-day true return shows up in the error term, and the regressor has very good
variability (see also Table 4). Consequently, the forward-premium test equation dominates the
dierence-of-returns version in that it involves just two price error terms plus one true morning
return and generates fewer missing data. In addition, times to maturity are well spread all over
the spectrum in the former equation. For the regressions based on rf or rf   rs, in contrast,
there is a low-variability sample most of the time, interrupted by a big outlier at the change
of the quinzaine which provides a very inuential subsample of just about 192 observations,
about 10 percent of the total. Yet using forward premiums instead of returns is not the perfect
solution either. Relative to the return-based regressions the drawback is that it uses cross-
market information, postulating that time value is taken into account to the same extent in
the two markets; the spot- or forward-return-based tests obviously do not need that. Since
no equation clearly dominates on all counts, we report results for both returns and forward
premiums.
2.3 Aggregated Estimates
In testing for settlement eects (or for integration and price leadership, for that matter) we rst
consider individual estimates. But we also want to look at aggregate or average results. For
one, aggregate results provide summary measures on, for example, the settlement eect for the
entire forward-spot Brussels Stock Exchange (the macro level) or for meaningful subgroups, like
turnover-based portfolios.11 An additional motivation for macro inference is that individual
estimates are often noisy and imprecise. Therefore, the test results from aggregate data could
support or complement the individual tests. For example, if most individual estimates are
signicant, aggregate estimates are expected to be so too, but the aggregate can be signicant
11Thanks to Pierre Hillion for this suggestion.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 14
even when most individual estimates are not. In this sense, we investigate a kind of average
of the estimates.
One question that arises in this connection is the heterogeneity among the estimates of the
individual series. According to Pesaran and Smith (1995), there are four procedures that can be
used to estimate this average eect: the mean group estimator (estimating separate regressions
for each group and averaging the coecients over groups), pooled regression, aggregate time-
series regressions, and cross-section regressions on group means. In the static case, where
the regressors are strictly exogenous and the coecients dier randomly and are distributed
independently of the regressors across groups, all four procedures provide a consistent and
unbiased estimate of the coecient means (Zellner, 1969). The aggregate time-series regression
procedure involve averaging data over groups into a portfolio. This procedure is not suitable
for our data because too many observation is lost during the aggregation. Since, in each of the
settlement-eect tests, the regressors are identical across stocks, the independence condition is
obviously met; so a panel data procedure for estimating the average eects is justied here. For
time value estimation in our studies, the aggregation estimate in principle equals the average
of the individual ones, since individual regressions have the same regressor.
2.4 Empirical Results on Settlement Eect Tests
We report the empirical results of the single return series tests and then of the forward premi-
ums test to estimate whether the time value is correctly reected in prices.
From Equations (9)-(12), the settlement eect is tested for by regressing the daily spot or
forward returns, or the daily forward premiums, on the corresponding time value:
E(rs;t+j(n sR)t) = s + s  (n sR)t; (13)
E(rf;tj(n fR)t) = f + f  (n fR)t; (14)
E(ptjtnf
sR) = p + p  t(nf
sR): (15)
We expect a slope of unity or, if there are tax eects (10% withholding tax), a number no
lower than 0.9.
The general picture is one of positive coecients; but typically less than half of the estimates
are above unity, and the aggregate coecients are below unity. There are some surprising
dierences across data types, though.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 15








































































Key Returns (spot) for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value eect, t(nR), and we expect a
slope of unity or at least 0.90. The gures show the slope estimates (to the left) and their p values (to the
right). The stocks are ranked by turnover. Stock 25, whose coecient falls outside the graph, has an outlier
estimate of -66.
Table 5: Time Value Eects in Returns and Forward premiums: selected summary
statistics in single-series tests
# of rejections of ... # of coecients > 1 per (sub)sample:
regressee j = 0 j = 1 both neither all low mid high
spot return 9 4 2 61 26 4 12 10
forward return 14 38 3 23 13 9 1 3
forward premium 25 36 7 18 14 9 2 3
Key Returns (spot or forward) and ex post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical
time-value eect, t(nR), and we expect a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The table provides some summary
statistics on the 72 slope estimates in each regression.
2.4.1 Spot returns
We start by outlining the ndings. At the individual level, the settlement-eect test suggests
that the time value is usually not correctly taken into account in the spot prices, but the
estimation uncertainties are huge. At the macro level, i.e. the aggregate regression, the panel-
data estimates show that the time value seems to be correctly reected in the spot prices in
the group of high-turnover stocks, but probably not in the mid-turnover group and denitely
not among the thinly-traded stocks. However, also because of low variation in the regressor,
the estimates are very imprecise in the total group and the three subgroups. Actually, even the
total absence of any attention to time-value factors is statistically acceptable for the groups of
low- and medium-turnover stocks.
Here are the details that support the above claims. The results for the equation-by-equation
tests in the spot market are summarized in Figure 2 and in the leftmost and top panels ofA Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 16
Table 6: Time Value Eects in Returns and Forward premiums: aggregates
sample single time-series ^  panel estimation of ^  Wald Test - Null: Slope=1
(by turnover) avge median n>1 ^  SE(^ ) t-stat prob F-stat d.o.f. prob
spot returns: E(rs+j(tn sR) =  +   t(n sR)
All -0.72 0.67 26 0.44 0.67 0.66 0.5113 0.68 (1, 95589) 0.4093
Low turnover -1.06 -0.22 4 -0.68 0.74 -0.92 0.3584 5.16 (1, 27574) 0.0231
Medium -2.16 1.03 12 0.56 0.71 0.79 0.4275 0.38 (1, 31167) 0.5363
High 1.07 0.94 10 1.19 0.77 1.55 0.1223 0.06 (1, 36846) 0.8077
forward returns: E(rfj((n fR)t) =  +   (n fR)t
All 0.55 0.27 13 0.29 0.16 1.81 0.0702 19.64 (1, 87549) 0.0000
Low turnover 1.01 0.56 9 0.47 0.22 2.14 0.0320 6.05 (1, 21684) 0.0139
Medium 0.17 0.14 1 0.23 0.18 1.27 0.2042 18.81 (1, 29195) 0.0000
High 0.45 0.23 3 0.24 0.19 1.27 0.2034 16.94 (1, 36668) 0.0000
forward premiums: E(ln(F=S)tj(t(nf
sR)) =  +   t(nf
sR)
All 0.29 14 0.44 0.41 0.09 4.74 0.0000 44.79 (1, 76670) 0.0000
All 0.44 0.29 14 0.41 0.09 4.74 0.0000 44.79 (1, 76670) 0.0000
Low turnover 0.85 0.66 9 0.56 0.16 3.54 0.0004 7.87 (1, 18009) 0.0050
Medium 0.15 0.36 2 0.43 0.10 4.16 0.0000 31.58 (1, 25829) 0.0000
High 0.33 0.21 3 0.33 0.10 3.19 0.0014 41.89 (1, 32830) 0.0000
Key Returns (spot or forward) and ex post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical
time-value eect, t(nR). We do this for the entire sample (72 stocks), and then for three subsamples (`low',
`medium', `high') of stocks arranged by average daily turnover.
Tables 5 and 6.12 Some of the news is quite good. Out of 72 coecients, 26 exceed unity; in
the mid- and high-turnover samples the gures are even 12/24 and 10/24, and the medians
for these groups are very close to unity. But all this is overlaid by a pattern of very noisy
estimates that exhibit a big negative skewness. Stock 25, in the mid-turnover group, achieves
an incomprehensible estimate of {66, producing a sub-sample mean of {2.16 against a median
of 1.03. Only for the high-turnover group, skewness does not seem a problem. Imprecision is
huge. No less than 61 stocks out of 72 accept both a zero and a unit value for the coecient.13
Only nine reject a zero value, and four a unit value; of these, two reject both.
The imprecision problem is our prime motivation for adding aggregate estimates. With
regard to the macro inference, the panel data estimates in the middle columns of in Table 6
shows that aggregates turn out to give less weight to the negative individual estimates, meaning
12In Figure 2, and in similar gures below, estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate.
For visibility, the dots are linked by line segments, but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
13All signicance statements in this paper are at the 5% level, one-sided.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 17









































































Key Returns (forward) for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value eect, t(nR), and we expect
a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The gures show the slope estimates and their p values. The stocks are ranked
by turnover.
that these were deemed to be very noisy; the resulting estimates are, roughly speaking, between
the unweighted means and the medians. The time value coecient is insignicantly positive in
the pooled sample of all 72 stocks and all the three subsamples; except for the the low-turnover
group, the coecient estimate is, in addition, not signicantly dierent from unity. As for the
other two groups, time value has no statistically signicant impact on returns and, for the
low-turnover stocks, its slope coecient is denitely not equal to unity either. We conclude
that, generally, and with the notable exception of most active stocks, the time value eect was
not taken into account in the spot prices.
2.4.2 Forward returns and forward premiums
The results for forward premiums and forward returns are similar. Also in these data the
general picture is one of coecients that are positive but below unity, as we substantiate below.
An expected nding is that precision is up, especially for forward premiums. Unexpectedly,
however, relative to results from spot returns, medians and general averages are generally
lower except for low turnover stocks (which, admittedly, did very badly in the spot-return-
based tests); and medium turnovers and especially the active stocks do worse in this test than
low turnover stocks. Lastly, there is right-skewness rather than left-skewness. Let us consider
the evidence behind these claims.
Out of the total 72 stocks, the number of series that accept both a unit and a zero slope
value falls from 61 (rs) to 23 (rf) and 18 (p). The number of stocks that reject both a zero andA Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 18












































































Key Realized forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on the theoretical time-value eect, t(nR), and
we expect a slope of unity or at least 0.90. The gures show the slope estimates and their p values. The stocks
are ranked by turnover.
a unit slope rises from 2 to 3 or 7. All this suggests better precision, as expected given the
clearer signals.
More precision should mean more signicantly non-zero results, everything else being the
same. The number of rejections of a zero slope rises from 9 to 14 (rf) or even 25 (p). One would
expect that these clearer signals also to be reected in prices to a larger extent than the feeble
signals that are present in spot markets; that is, also coecients should rise. Yet this turns out
to be too optimistic. Most of the estimates are positive indeed, but the number of slopes above
unity has shrunk from 26 (spot returns) to 13 (forward returns) or 14 (premiums). Relatedly,
more stocks|38 or 36, up from 4|now reject a unit slope. Average and median slopes are
down in all samples except the small-volume group. Curiously, in light of the spot-return
results and intuition, low-turnover stocks actually do best now: most above-unity slopes now
are low-turnover stocks (9/13 for rf, 9/14 for p instead of 4/26 for rs). This is also reected in
the averages and medians of the single-series estimates: these look impressively close to unity
for low-turnover stocks, and then fall if we go higher on the turnover scale.
As for the macro analysis, the panel data estimation in Table 6 shows that except for the
mid- and high-turnover groups in the forward return test, time value is denitely a factor in all
the remaining six cases: each of the six coecient estimates is signicantly positive. Yet, they
now also all reject a unit slope statistically, and even the best numbers are farther below unity
than what we saw in spot data. Third, again conrming the results from individual regressions
and contrasting with the ndings from spot data, the highest aggregate coecient is for the
low-turnover group, with the lowest for the medium- (rf) or the high-turnover stocks (p).A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 19
To sum up: In the spot market we actually see very little evidence in favor or against a
time-value eect. In the forward markets, where the time value signals should be stronger,
we do nd that time value aects prices, but the eect is substantially smaller than what
theory predicts. As expected, the estimate from the forward premiums provides the cleanest
results, but even there the estimates remain below our theoretical priors|and, indeed, below
the results for forward returns. In the next section, we question the hypothesis of market
eciency, where the forward premiums are unpredictable.
3 Autocorrelation in the Price Discrepancies
Let us dene the settlement-corrected forward price and premium as follows:
F0
t := Ft
1 + n s;tRt









t+1 + ef;t   es;t: (18)
As of now, the prime refers to the time-value-corrected version, p0.
In our proposed model for the ecient markets, we assume that the true return  and the
noises s are unpredictable. This hypothesis means that the the premium p0 should have zero
autocorrelation. We now examine the autocorrelation of the forward premium.
3.1 Autocorrelations in Forward premiums
Figure 5 summarizes the autocorrelation of forward premium for the individual stock estimates
visually, while Table 7 provides some numerical information. The obvious feature is that
autocorrelation is positive. Out of the total 72 cases, only one estimate actually is negative,
and only marginally so, while 66 cases or 91.7% of the estimates are signicantly positive. The
averages and the number of signicant rejections tend to fall the more active the stock is, but
the eect is quite slight: the general average coecient is 0.27, falling from 0.32 to 0.24 as we
go from thinly to actively-traded stocks; the medians are similar.
For aggregates obtained via panel regression we test the independence assumption by re-
gressing, for every equation, the 72 slopes on the corresponding turnovers. For the sample as a
whole there is, unsurprisingly, a signicant negative relation, but within turnover groups thereA Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 20





















































































Key Ex post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. This slope, 1, estimates the
scaled autocovariance of the forward premiums. A zero 1 means that forward premiums are not correlated, a
positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning that the true-morning-return is also auto-
correlated of rst-order. We show estimated gammas and their p-values for all stocks, arranged by daily average
turnover.














sample individual series estimation panel estimation
(by turnover) mean median n>0 sgnf>0 sgnf<0 ^ 1 SE(.) t-stat prob
All 0.27 0.26 71 68 0 0.29 0.011 25.33 0.0000
Low turnover 0.32 0.32 24 23 0 0.32 0.022 14.30 0.0000
Medium 0.26 0.26 23 22 0 0.27 0.016 17.08 0.0000
High 0.24 0.20 24 23 0 0.26 0.012 21.50 0.0000
Key Ex post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. A zero  means that forward
premiums are not correlated, a positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning positive
autocorrelation in the true-morning return. We show summary statistics for all stocks and for three subsamples
of stocks arranged by daily average turnover.
is no more clear link (Table 8). The aggregates are very similar to the straightforward means
of individual estimates, and are clearly dierent from zero. All this implies that the forward
premium is predictable, which is a sign of ineciency|for example, a dierentially slow dis-
semination of the fundamental information for at least one day14. This phenomenon occurs
across the entire spectrum of trading volume. So, the question is what prevented traders from
making use of the predictability in the forward premiums.
14Autocorrelation in the true morning returns could be a source of autocorrelation in price discrepancies, but
it is almost unthinkable, in an ecient market, that the true returns could generate daily autocorrelation of 0.3.
Also, se see no such high autocorrelation in either spot or forward returns.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 21
Table 8: Preparing for Panel estimation: Independence Tests for Slopes
regressing j on turnover regressing j on turnover
slope t-stat prob slope t-stat prob
All -1.80 -2.63 0.0104 -15.10 -5.87 0.0000
Low turnover 2.96 0.10 0.9199 -142.38 -2.07 0.0505
Medium 12.35 1.90 0.0707 -84.63 -3.07 0.0057
High -0.37 -0.40 0.6943 -2.97 -0.82 0.4207
Key 1 estimates the scaled autocovariance of forward premiums. To be able to estimate the mean gamma via
panel regressions with a common slope we need to test that individual stocks' gammas are deviating randomly
from a general mean. Here we test whether there is a relation with turnover, rst in the all-stock sample and
then in the three subsamples of stocks assembled on the basis of average daily turnover.
3.2 Event Study Test: a Sign-related Asymmetry
In this part, we search for an explanation for the high autocorrelations. Problems in shorting
in the spot market could be a candidate. If this is the case, then, upon bad news, spot prices
would be slower to react than forward prices (where shorting is very easy). Thus, upon bad
news, the ratio of forward over spot prices would be temporarily depressed, meaning that
negative p0s would tend to persist for some time. Positive p0s, in contrast, should disappear
overnight as buying spot is no more dicult than buying forward.
We test this via an event study. Table 9 shows average abnormal forward premiums in the
period of 1 to 10 days after an `event', with the event being dened as a forward premium
exceeding, respectively, 2, 3, or 4 percent (positive events) or falling below -2, -3, or -4 percent
(negative events).
The result is that, after negative mispricing irrespectively of the size, the next-day abnormal
premium was close to zero. The result for positive premiums is dierent: conditional on an
unusually high initial forward premium, it takes several days for the abnormal premium to
decay towards zero. Typically, one-third of a large positive premium is still there the next day,
against about one-tenth for negative outliers. The phenomenon of conditional autocorrelation
is most pronounced with the less active stocks. This is exactly the opposite of what one would
expect when shorting is dicult. An additional striking fact is that positive extreme events
are more than twice as frequent as negative ones.
Clearly, then, the problem is not so much that shorting the stock is dicult in the spot
market. Rather, a desire to economize on cash seems to be at the root of the persistent
discrepancies. In a setting where, suciently often, the marginal agents are cash-strapped,A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 22
Table 9: Average Abnormal Forward premiums: Event Study
positive events
>2% # of Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 3435 2.38 0.94 0.71 0.65 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.52
Low turnover 1450 2.42 1.22 0.95 0.94 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.67 0.60
Medium 1127 2.38 0.83 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.53 0.49 0.42 0.54 0.45 0.59
High 858 2.35 0.79 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.36
>3% # of Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1324 3.42 1.19 0.82 0.61 0.64 0.73 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.54 0.50
Low turnover 662 3.45 1.50 0.99 0.89 0.84 1.01 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.67
Medium 377 3.40 1.40 0.89 0.55 0.69 0.85 0.51 0.37 0.65 0.52 0.38
High 285 3.42 0.70 0.56 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.24 0.32 0.31 0.43
>4% # of Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1055 5.30 1.30 0.99 0.78 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.62
Low turnover 612 5.46 2.13 1.44 1.23 1.05 1.07 1.05 0.77 0.97 0.90 0.88
Medium 320 5.25 1.20 0.97 0.79 0.69 0.62 0.42 0.65 0.51 0.34 0.49
High 123 5.16 0.53 0.51 0.29 0.44 0.36 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.63 0.48
negative events
<-2% # of Day0 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1542 -2.42 -0.18 0.07 0.16 0.31 0.17 0.29 0.23 0.14 0.26 0.22
Low turnover 519 -2.42 -0.20 0.10 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.25 0.38 0.37 0.35
Medium 568 -2.42 -0.20 0.17 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.17 0.24 -0.01 0.25 0.23
High 455 -2.40 -0.14 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.18 0.09
<-3% # of Day0 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 547 -3.41 -0.45 -0.01 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.20 0.26
Low turnover 192 -3.42 -0.52 0.01 0.13 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.59 0.51 0.43
Medium 249 -3.38 -0.48 0.19 0.03 0.21 0.24 -0.23 0.06 -0.11 0.21 0.24
High 106 -3.44 -0.34 -0.25 0.03 -0.09 -0.24 0.08 0.17 0.12 -0.17 0.11
<-4% # of Day0 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 442 -5.21 -0.47 -0.06 0.23 -0.09 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.29
Low turnover 193 -5.28 -0.79 -0.26 0.46 -0.29 0.62 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.09 0.69
Medium 192 -5.26 -0.33 0.05 0.10 -0.16 0.11 0.58 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.18
High 57 -5.07 -0.20 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.12 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.14 -0.09
Key We show the average realized forward premium on days 1, ... 10 following an event, the event being dened
as a forward premium (shown on the column for day 0) exceeding either 2, 3 or 4% or below either {2, {3 or
{4%. We expect a zero mean, in well-integrated and well-functioning markets. `All' refers to all stocks; `Low',
`Medium' and `High' refer to subsamples of 24 stocks each, assembled on the basis of average daily turnover.
buyers would prefer the forward market while sellers would go for a spot sale. This would
then imply patterns of persistently high forward prices, relative to spot values. It would also
explain why these occurrences are so much more frequent than instances of very low prices.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 23
4 Conclusions
Both spot and forward tiers of the BSE fail to always reect the correct time value eect: in the
spot tier, the time value eect is insignicant, while in the forward tier the (traces of) time value
eects are limited to low-volume stocks. Additionally, a close look at the price discrepancies
reveals that borrowing restrictions or other problems with quickly raising liquidities could be
a reason for the autocorrelation: negative ex post premiums vanish overnight (on average),
and the positive premiums are much more frequent and, on average, persistent. This pattern
is consistent with a cash scarcity problem, steering buyers to the levered forward market and
sellers to the spot tier, rather than with problems in shorting stocks in the cash market.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 24
Appendix I: Evaluating the Potential Bias in the Time-Value
Tests
One possible objection against the standard regression test for time value eects is that true
returns should be higher, on average, in periods with high risk-free rates, which would then
introduce some correlation between noise and the regressor and hence bias the coecient
upward.
However, due to low variation of the risk-free rate, the bias is negligible, as proved below.
In the regression of forward rate rf;t on the time value n f;tRt, where n f;t = (n f;t  n f;t 1), is
rf;t =  +   n f;tRt + t + e f;t   e f;t 1: (19)
with (t + e f;t   e f;t 1) being the residual. The bias is introduced by the correlation between
the true return t and the risk-free rate Rt:













In the extreme case, i.e. corr(t;Rt) = 1, the highest magnitude of bias is E(n f;t)
var(n f;tRt) 
p
var(t)var(Rt). We can roughly calculate the following numbers from the data:
E(n f;t) : -9.640E-04
var(n f;tRt) : 1.E-06
sqrtvar(Rt) : 6.79E-05
So the maximum bias is  0:65456 
p
var(t), with t being not higher than the observed
prices, i.e. spot prices. Taking Delhaize stock in the studied period as an example, the standard
deviation of the spot prices was 0.012, which makes the maximum bias  0:000785472. This
negligible bias makes interpretation of the OLS estimates in the single-market series plausible.A Note on Time Value in Spot and Forward Prices on the BSE 25
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